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Epistemic Planning has been used to achieve ontic and epis-
temic control in multi-agent situations. We extend the for-
malism to include perspective shifts, allowing us to define a
class of cooperative problems in which both action planning
and execution is done in a purely distributed fashion, meaning
coordination is only allowed implicitly by means of the avail-
able epistemic actions. While this approach can be fruitfully
applied to model reasoning in some simple social situations,
we also provide some benchmark applications to show that
the concept is useful for multi-agent systems in practice.
1 Introduction
One important task in Multi-Agent Systems is to collabora-
tively reach a joint goal with multiple autonomous agents.
The problem is particularly challenging in situations where
the knowledge required to reach the goal is distributed
among the agents. Most existing approaches therefore ap-
ply some centralized coordinating instance from the out-
side, strictly separating the stages of communication and
negotiation from the agents’ internal planning and reason-
ing processes. In contrast, building upon the epistemic plan-
ning framework by Bolander and Andersen (2011), we pro-
pose a decentralized planning notion in which each agent
has to individually reason about the entire problem and au-
tonomously decide when and how to (inter-)act. For this,
both reasoning about the other agents’ possible contribu-
tions and reasoning about their capabilities of performing
the same reasoning is needed. We achieve our notion of im-
plicitly coordinated plans by requiring all desired commu-
nicative abilities to be modeled as epistemic actions which
then can be planned alongside their ontic counterparts, thus
enabling the agents to perform observations and coordinate
at runtime. While this imposes certain restrictions on the
problems that can be solved, it captures the intuition that
communication clearly constitutes an action by itself and,
more subtly, that even a purely ontic action can play a com-
municative role (e.g. indirectly suggesting follow-up actions
to another agent). Thus, for many problems our approach
appears quite natural. On the practical side, the epistemic
planning framework allows a very expressive way of defin-
ing both the agents’ physical and communicative abilities
and thereby seems an ideal choice in our case.
Our work directly builds upon the framework introduced
by Bolander and Andersen (2011) and Lo¨we, Pacuit, and
Witzel (2011), who formulated the planing problem in the
context of Dynamic Epistemic Logic (DEL) (van Ditmarsch,
van der Hoek, and Kooi 2007). Andersen, Bolander, and
Jensen (2012) extended the approach to allow strong and
weak conditional planning in the single-agent case. Sim-
ilar to Bolander and Andersen (2011), we use search in
the space of epistemic states to find a solution. This is in
contrast to compilation approaches inspired by Palacios and
Geffner (2009), which are popular and successful in the AI
planning community. These approaches map an epistemic
(or doxastic) planning problem to a corresponding classical
one allowing to solve the problem using a classical plan-
ner (Muise et al. 2015; Kominis and Geffner 2015). How-
ever, these approaches can only deal with bounded nesting
of knowledge (or belief) and can produce only sequential
plans. There is an important similarity between the work by
Muise et al. (2015) and ours, though: In both approaches,
it is possible to shift the perspective from agent to agent
along the plan. In particular this possibility of perspective
shifts distinguishes these approaches from more traditional
multi-agent planning (Brenner and Nebel 2009). Recent
work in this area by Nissim and Brafman (2014) proposes
a search algorithm for multi-agent planning that allows pri-
vate actions and a certain degree of decentralization that
achieves efficiency at the cost of not supporting reasoning
about knowledge of other agents or only implicitly.
2 Theoretical Background
2.1 Epistemic language and epistemic states
We first recapitulate the foundations of DEL, following the
conventions of Bolander and Andersen (2011). This means
that our version of DEL includes postconditions allowing for
ontic/factual change, but postconditions are without loss of
expressivity limited to conjunctions of literals (as in classical
planning).
Definition 1. The epistemic language LKC(P,A) with re-
spect to a set of atomic propositions P and a finite set of
agents A is
' ::= p | ¬' | ' ^ ' |Ki' | C'
where p 2 P and i 2 A.
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We readKi' as “agent i knows '” and C' as “it is com-
mon knowledge (among all agents) that'”. In the following,
we will always use P to denote our set of atomic proposi-
tions, and A our set of agents. Formulas of the epistemic
language are evaluated in epistemic models.
Definition 2. An epistemic model over (P,A) is a triple
M = hW, (Ri)i2A, V i where
• The domainW is a non-empty finite set of worlds.
• Ri ✓ W ⇥W is an equivalence relation called the indis-
tinguishability relation for agent i.
• V : P ! W assigns a valuation to each atomic proposi-
tion.
ForWd ✓W , the pair (M,Wd) is called an epistemic state
(or simply state), and the worlds of Wd are called the des-
ignated worlds. An epistemic state is called global ifWd is
a singleton. The designated world of a global state is called
the actual world. In general, (M,Wd) can be thought of as
the belief state {(M, {w}) | w 2Wd} over possible global
states. An epistemic state (M,Wd) is called a local state
for agent i ifWd is closed underRi. A local state is minimal
ifWd is a minimal set closed under Ri. Given an epistemic
state (M,Wd), the associated local state of agent i, denoted
(M,Wd)i, is (M, {v | wRiv, w 2Wd}).
Definition 3. Let (M,Wd) be an epistemic state where
M = hW, (Ri)i2A, V i. For i 2 A, p 2 P and ', 2
LKC(P,A), we define truth as follows:
(M,Wd) |= ' iff (M, w) |= ' f.a. w 2Wd
(M, w) |= p iff w 2 V (p)
(M, w) |= ¬' iffM, w 6|= '
(M, w) |= ' ^  iffM, w |= ' andM, w |=  
(M, w) |= Ki' iffM, w0 |= ' f.a. w0 2W s.t. wRiw0
(M, w) |= C' iffM, w0 |= ' f.a. w0 2W s.t. wR⇤w0
where R⇤ is the transitive closure of
S
i2ARi.
Example 1. A global epistemic state describes an epistemic
situation from a global perspective, where the actual world
has been pointed out. Consider the following global state
(M, {w1}), where the nodes represent worlds and the edges
represent the indistinguishability relations (reflexive edges
left out):
w1 : p w2 :
1, 2
We use to denote the designated worlds, in this case only
w1. The actual world is w1 where p holds, but for agent
1 (and 2) the actual world w1 is indistinguishable from the
world w2 where p is false. Since agent 1 is ignorant about
whether the actual world is w1 or w2, the model that rep-
resents his local view on the situation is (M, {w1, w2}),
which is exactly his associated local state of (M, {w1}).
The point is that since agent 1 is unable to point out whether
the actual world is w1 or w2, his internal state must consider
both as candidates for being the actual world, and this is ex-
actly what the model (M, {w1, w2}) = (M, {w1})1 does.
We have (M, {w1})1 6|= p and (M, {w1})1 6|= ¬p, corre-
sponding to the fact that from agent 1’s local perspective it
can not be verified whether p holds or not.
2.2 Perspective shifts
In general, given an epistemic state (M,Wd), the associated
local state (M,Wd)i will represent agent i’s internal per-
spective on that state. Going from (M,Wd) to (M,Wd)i
amounts to a perspective shift, where the perspective is
shifted to the local perspective of agent i. Note that we
have the following properties, where the third follows di-
rectly from the two first:
Lemma 1. Let (M,Wd) be an epistemic state over (P,A),
i 2 A and ' 2 LKC(P,A).
1. (M,Wd)i |= ' iff (M,Wd) |= Ki'.
2. If (M,Wd) is local for agent i then (M,Wd)i =
(M,Wd).
3. If (M,Wd) is local for agent i then (M,Wd) |= ' iff
(M,Wd) |= Ki'.
Perspective shifts are of fundamental importance in multi-
agent planning to allow an agent to reason about the other
agents’ possible contributions to a plan.
2.3 Dynamic language and epistemic actions
To model actions, we use the event models of DEL.
Definition 4. An event model over (P,A) is a tuple E =
hE, (Qi)i2A, pre, posti where
• The domain E is a non-empty finite set of events.
• Qi ✓ E ⇥ E is an equivalence relation called the indis-
tinguishability relation for agent i.
• pre : E ! LKC(P,A) assigns a precondition to each
event.
• post : E ! LKC(P,A) assigns a postcondition to each
event. For all e 2 E, post(e) is a conjunction of literals
(atomic propositions and their negations).
For Ed ✓ E, the pair (E , Ed) is called an epistemic action
(or simply action), and the events in Ed are called the desig-
nated events. Similar to epistemic states, (E , Ed) is called a
local action for agent i when Ed is closed under Qi.
Each event of an epistemic action represents a different
possible outcome. By using multiple events e, e0 2 E that
are indistinguishable (i.e. eQie0), it is possible to obfuscate
the outcomes for some agent i 2 A, i.e. modeling partially
observable actions. Using event models with |Ed| > 1, it is
also possible to model sensing actions and nondeterministic
actions (Bolander and Andersen 2011).
The product update is used to specify the successor state
resulting from the application of an action in a state.
Definition 5. Let a state (M,Wd) and an action (E , Ed)
over (P,A) be given with M = hW, (Ri)i2A, V i and E =
hE, (Qi)i2A, pre, posti. Then the product update is defined
as (M,Wd)⌦ (E , Ed) = (hW 0, (R0i)i2A, V 0i ,W 0d) where
• W 0 = {(w, e) 2W ⇥ E | M, w |= pre(e)}
• R0i = {((w, e), (w0, e0)) 2W 0 ⇥W 0 | wRiw0 and eQie0}
• V 0(p) = {(w, e) 2W 0 | post(e) |= p or
(M, w |= p and post(e) 6|= ¬p)}
• W 0d = {(w, e) 2W 0 | w 2Wd, e 2 Ed}.
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If both (M,Wd) and (E , Ed) are local for agent i, then so
is (M,Wd)⌦ (E , Ed) (Bolander and Andersen 2011).
Example 2. Consider the following epistemic action
(E , {e1, e2}), using the same conventions as for epistemic
models, except each event e is labelled by hpre(e), post(e)i:
e1 : hp,>i e2 : h¬p,>i
2
It is a private sensing action for agent 1, where (only) agent
1 gets to know the truth value of p, since e1 and e2 are dis-
tinguishable to agent 1. Letting (M, {w1}) denote the state
from Example 1, we get:
(M, {w1})⌦ (E , {e1, e2}) =
(w1, e1) : p (w2, e2) :
2
Hence (M, {w1}) ⌦ (E , {e1, e2}) is exactly as (M, {w1})
except the indistinguishability edge for agent 1 is removed.
So the private sensing action reveals to agent 1 that p is true
(without revealing it to agent 2). Before executing the ac-
tion, agent 1 however does not know whether he will learn
p or ¬p, which is signified by (M, {w1})1 ⌦ (E , {e1, e2})
having both a designated p world and a designated ¬p world
(it differs from the model (M, {w1})⌦ (E , {e1, e2}) shown
above exactly by (w2, e2) also being designated).
We extend the language LKC(P,A) into the dynamic lan-
guage LDEL(P,A) by adding a modality [(E , e)] for each
event model E = (E, (Qi)i2A, pre, post) over (P,A) and
e 2 E. The truth conditions are extended with the following
standard clause from DEL:
(M, w) |= [(E , e)]' iff
(M, w) |= pre(e) implies (M, w)⌦ (E , e) |= '.
We define the following abbreviations: [(E , Ed)]' :=V
e2Ed [(E , e)]' and h(E , Ed)i' := ¬[(E , Ed)]¬'. We say
that an action (E , Ed) is applicable in a state (M,Wd) if for
all w 2 Wd there is an event e 2 Ed s.t. (M, w) |= pre(e).
Intuitively, an action is applicable in a state if for each pos-
sible situation (designated world), at least one possible out-
come (designated event) is specified. Let s = (M,Wd)
denote an epistemic state and a = (E , Ed) an action. An-
dersen (2015) shows that a is applicable in s iff s |= hai>,
and that s |= [a]' iff s ⌦ a |= '. We now define a further
abbreviation: ((a))' := hai> ^ [a]'. Hence:
s |= ((a))' iff a is applicable in s and s⌦ a |= ' (1)
Thus ((a))' means that the application of a is possible and
will (necessarily) lead to a state fulfilling '.
3 Cooperative Planning
We will now consider different types of planning problems
and solution concepts in the setting of DEL-based planning.
In the simplest case, a planning problem hs0, A,'gi over
(P,A) consists of an initial epistemic state s0 over (P,A), a
setA of epistemic actions over (P,A) and a goal formula 'g
of LKC(P,A). Informally, a (sequential) solution to such a
planning problem is a sequence of actions (a1, . . . , an) from
A, such that executing the sequence in s0 leads to a state
satisfying 'g . In the DEL-based setting, the state-transition
function mapping a state-action pair (s, a) into the state re-
sulting from executing a in s is given by (s, a) 7! s ⌦ a
(when a is not applicable in s, the state-transition function
is taken to be undefined on (s, a)). Hence, more formally, a
solution to hs0, A,'gi is a sequence of actions (a1, . . . , an)
from A such that for all i = 1, . . . , n, the action ai is appli-
cable in s0⌦a1⌦ · · ·⌦ai 1, and s0⌦a1⌦ · · ·⌦an |= 'g .
Note that by (1) above, these conditions are equivalent to
simply requiring s0 |= ((a1))((a2)) · · · ((an))'g .
This solution concept is equivalent to the one considered
in (Bolander and Andersen 2011). In that paper, the initial
state as well as all actions are supposed to be modelled from
the perspective of one single planning agent, that is, be lo-
cal to that agent. Such a setting provides a natural formal
framework for a single agent acting alone in a multi-agent
environment, but does not provide a systematic solution to
the case where multiple agents are (inter)acting towards a
joint goal. The latter situation is what we wish to consider
in this paper.
For cooperative multi-agent planning towards a joint goal,
we identify the following settings:
1. Centralized planning, meaning one instance (having com-
plete or incomplete knowledge, e.g. as one of the agents)
generates a plan in advance, which, if given to and exe-
cuted by the cooperative agents, will lead to a goal state.
2. Decentralized planning. Here each agent does the plan-
ning process for himself. Usually this is done as part of a
multi-agent architecture where the agents announce their
plans, negotiate, solve conflicts, etc.
3. Decentralized planning with implicit coordination. In this
scenario, all coordination is achieved implicitly through
observing the effects of the actions of other agents. The
rationale is, if all of the agents act to compatible indi-
vidual plans (which may include assumptions on other
agents’ actions and plans), the goal condition can be
reached without explicit coordination and commitments.
This paper focuses on the concept of decentralized plan-
ning with implicit coordination, which relies closely on the
perspective-shifting capabilities of the epistemic planning
framework and is, to the best of our knowledge, novel to
this paper. Using our approach, it is possible to solve some
multi-agent problems by just specifying a common goal di-
rective for all the agents in a system, given some optimistic
assumptions, namely common knowledge of the available
actions, consistent internal models of the situation and per-
fect reasoning capacity of all agents. The agents can then
take the necessary steps (deducing compatible plans and act-
ing on them) in a generic, autonomous manner.
Let A denote a set of actions, and A a set of agents. In
this paper we assume each action to be executable by a sin-
gle agent, that is, we are not considering joint actions. For
technical reasons, we wish each action to be executable by a
unique agent, which we call the owner of the action. More
precisely, an owner function is a mapping ! : A! A, map-
ping each action to the agent who can execute it (who owns
it). This approach is closely related to the one by Lo¨we,
Pacuit, and Witzel (2011). Mapping each action to a unique
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agent can be done without loss of generality, since semanti-
cally equivalent duplicates can always be added to the action
set.
Example 3. As mentioned above, our framework is based
on the assumption that there is common knowledge of
the available actions in the action set A (so that agents
can always correctly reason about the actions available to
themselves and others). This however does not imply that
agents are always aware of the actions executed by others.
Consider the following two actions owned by agent 1:
ap =
e1 : h>, pi e2 : h>, qi
2, 3
aq =
e1 : h>, pi e2 : h>, qi
2, 3
The action ap makes p true and aq makes q true. If agent 1
executes ap, agents 2 and 3 will still consider it possible that
q was made true (due to the indistinguishability edge in ap),
and conversely for aq . Let s0 be a singleton model where
no atoms are true: s0 = w : . Then ap is applicable in
s0 and the execution will result in:
s0 ⌦ ap =
(w, e1) : p (w, e2) : q
2, 3
We see that s0 ⌦ ap |= p from which we get s0 |= ((ap)) p,
using (1). As s0 is clearly local to all 3 agents, we can
apply item 3 of Lemma 1 to conclude s0 |= Ki((ap)) p for
i = 1, 2, 3. Note also that s0 ⌦ ap |= ¬Kjp for j = 2, 3,
and hence s0 |= ((ap))¬Kjp using again (1). Hence we get:
s0 |= Ki((ap))p for i = 1, 2, 3 (2)
s0 |= ((ap))¬Kjp for j = 2, 3 (3)
The intuition is this: All agents know that executing ap leads
to p, since they know the action set. This is captured by (2).
However, even after ap has been executed, agents 2 and 3
do not know p, since for them action ap is indistinguishable
from action aq (they will not know whether ap or aq was
chosen by agent 1). This is captured by (3).
The only situations where it makes sense to have both (2)
and (3) above are when agents 2 and 3 can mistake the ac-
tion ap for another action. To only consider such sensible
scenarios we will require our action sets A to satisfy the fol-
lowing closure property: If (E , Ed) 2 A and e is an event in
E , then there exists a set E0d with e 2 E0d and (E , E0d) 2 A.
If A satisfies this property, it is called closed.
We are now finally ready to formally define our notion of
a cooperative epistemic planning problem.
Definition 6. A cooperative planning problem (or simply a
planning problem) ⇧ = hs0, A,!,'gi over (P,A) consists
of
• an initial epistemic state s0 over (P,A)
• a finite, closed set of epistemic actions A over (P,A)
• an owner function ! : A! A
• a goal formula 'g 2 LKC(P,A)
such that each a 2 A is local for !(a). When s0 is a global
state, we call it a global cooperative planning problem (or
simply a global planning problem). When s0 is local for
agent i, we call it a cooperative planning problem for agent
i (or simply a planning problem for agent i). Given a global
planning problem ⇧ = hs0, A,!,'gi, the associated plan-
ning problem for agent i is ⇧i = hs0i, A,!,'gi.
Given a multi-agent system is facing a global planning
problem ⇧, then each individual agent i is facing the plan-
ning problem ⇧i (agent i cannot observe the global state s0
directly, only the associated local state s0i).
In the following, we define sequential and conditional im-
plicitly coordinated solution concepts for cooperative plan-
ning problems.
3.1 Sequential Plans
We first want to define our notion of an implicitly coordi-
nated sequential solution to a planning problem. We wish
every agent to plan for himself, but come up with cooper-
ative plans involving also the required actions of the other
agents. Intuitively, we want the planning agent to be able
to both verify the validity of the plan itself (that it reaches
the goal), and to verify that each of the involved agents can
do the same for their respective subplans given their local
information.
Definition 7. Let ⇧ = hs0, A,!,'gi be a cooperative plan-
ning problem. An implicitly coordinated plan (or simply
plan) for ⇧ is a sequence (a1, . . . , an) of actions from A
such that:
s0 |= K!(a1)((a1))K!(a2)((a2)) · · ·K!(an)((an))'g (4)
If⇧ is a planning problem for agent i, we call the plan a plan
for agent i. A plan for agent i to a global planning problem
⇧ is a plan for ⇧i.
Note that a formula of the form K!(a)((a))' expresses
“the owner of action a knows that a is applicable and will
lead to '”. Equation (4) hence expresses that a solution
(a1, . . . , an) should satisfy the following:
The owner of the first action a1 knows that a1 is initially
applicable and will lead to a situation where the owner
of the second action a2 knows that a2 is applicable and
will lead to a situation where... the owner of the nth
action an knows that an is applicable and will lead to
the goal being satisfied.
Example 4. Consider the cooperative planning problem
⇧ = hs0, {ap, aq},!, pi over ({p, q}, {1, 2, 3}) where s0,
ap and aq are as in Example 3 and !(ap) = !(aq) = 1.
Note that ⇧ = ⇧i for all i 2 {1, 2, 3}: The planning prob-
lem “looks the same” to all agents. The single-element se-
quence (ap) is an (implicitly coordinated) plan for ⇧ since
!(ap) = 1 and s0 |= K1((ap)) p by (2). This is indeed a
plan for all agents i = 1, 2, 3, since it is a plan for all ⇧i.
In other words, all agents can individually come up with the
implicitly coordinated plan (ap). They all know that all that
has to be done is for agent 1 to execute ap, and they know
that agent 1 knows this himself.
Now consider extending the planning problem as follows.
We add two more actions ar and as given by:
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ar =
e1 : hp, ri e2 : hp, si
1, 3
as =
e1 : hp, ri e2 : hp, si
1, 3
Consider the cooperative planning problem ⇧0 =
hs0, {ap, aq, ar, as},!, ri where ! is extended by
!(ar) = !(as) = 2. A successful plan is clearly
(ap, ar) since s0 |= ((ap))((ar))r. However, it does not
qualify as an implicitly coordinated plan for any of the
agents, since it can be showed that s0 6|= K1((ap))K2((ar))r.
The problem is that even if agent 1 starts out by executing
ap, agent 2 will not know he did (cf. Example 3), and hence
agent 2 will not at runtime know that he can apply ar to
achieve r.
Consider adding a fifth action p! := e : hp,>i with
!(p!) = 1. This is a public announcement of p by agent
1. Extending ⇧0 with the action p!, all agents can again find
an implicitly coordinated plan, namely (ap, p!, ar): agent 1
first makes p true, then announces that he did, which makes
agent 2 know that he can apply ar to make r true.
The following proposition gives a more structural charac-
terization of implicitly coordinated plans. It thus becomes
clear that such plans can be found by performing a breadth-
first search over the set of successively applicable actions,
shifting the perspective for each state transition to the owner
of the respective action.
Proposition 2. For a cooperative planning problem ⇧ =
hs0, A,!,'i,
• () is an implicitly coordinated plan for ⇧ iff s0 |= '
• (a1, . . . , an) with n   1 is an implicitly coor-
dinated plan for ⇧ iff a1 is applicable in s0!(a1)
and (a2, . . . , an) is an implicitly coordinated plan for⌦
s0!(a1) ⌦ a1, A,!,'
↵
.
The proof is simple and hence omitted (it relies on (1),
Lemma 1 and (4)).
Example 5. As a more practical example, consider a sit-
uation with agents A = {1, 2, 3} where a letter is to be
passed from agent 1 to one of the other two agents, pos-
sibly via the third agent. Mutually exclusive propositions
at-1, at-2, at-3 2 P are used to denote the current carrier of
the letter, while for-1, for-2, for-3 2 P denote the addressee.
In our example, agent 1 has a letter for agent 3, so at-1 and
for-3 are initially true.
s0 =
at-1, for-2 at-1, for-3
2, 3
In s0, all agents know that agent 1 has the letter (at-1),
but agents 2 and 3 do not know who of them is the ad-
dressee (for-2 or for-3). We assume that agent 1 can only
exchange letters with agent 2 and agent 2 can only exchange
letters with agent 3. We thus define the four possible ac-
tions a12, a21, a23, a32, with aij being the composite action
of agent i publicly passing the letter to agent j and privately
informing him about the correct addressee. I.e.
aij =
hat-i ^ for-2,¬at-i ^ at-ji hat-i ^ for-3,¬at-i ^ at-ji
A \ {i, j}
Given that the joint goal is to pass a letter to its addressee,
the global planning problem then is ⇧ = hs0, A,!,'gi with
• A = {a12, a21, a23, a32},




Consider the action sequence (a12, a23): Agent 1 passes the
letter to agent 2, and agent 2 passes it on to agent 3. It can




i 6|= K1((a12))K2((a23))'g for i = 2, 3
Hence (a12, a23) is an implicitly coordinated plan for agent
1, but not for agents 2 and 3.
This is because in the beginning, agents 2 and 3 do not
know for who of them the letter is intended and hence can-
not verify that (a12, a23) will lead to a goal state. However,
after agent 1’s execution of a12, agent 2 can distinguish be-
tween the possible addressees at runtime, and find his sub-
plan (a23), as contemplated by agent 1.
3.2 Conditional Plans
Sequential plans are often not sufficient to solve a given epis-
temic planning problem. In particular, as soon as nondeter-
ministic action outcomes or splits on obtained observations
come into play, we need conditional plans to solve such a
problem. Consider for instance a problem where agents 1
and 2 need to cooperate as follows: Agent 1 starts out with
an action a1 that provides necessary information to agent 2
on how to continue, and depending on the new information,
agent 2 needs to continue either with action a2 or a3 in or-
der to achieve the joint goal. Unlike Andersen, Bolander,
and Jensen (2012), who represent conditional plans as ac-
tion trees with branches depending on knowledge formula
conditions, we represent them as policy functions (⇡i)i2A,
mapping minimal local epistemic states to actions for their
respective observer agents.
First we define a few new pieces of notation. For the rest
of this section, except in examples, we fix a set P of atomic
propositions and a set A of agents. Hence all considered
cooperative planning problems will be over the pair (P,A)
without this being mentioned explicitly. Given i 2 A, we
use Smini to denote the set of minimal local states of agent
i over (P,A). We use Sgl to denote the set of global states
over (P,A). For any epistemic state s = (M,Wd) we let
Globals(s) = {(M, w) | w 2 Wd}. Hence Globals(s) is
the set of global states “contained in” s.
We now define two different types of policies, joint poli-
cies and global policies, and later show them to be equiva-
lent.
Definition 8 (Joint policy). Let ⇧ = hs0, A,!,'gi be a
cooperative planning problem. Then a joint policy (⇡i)i2A
consists of partial functions ⇡i : Smini ! A where for each
(s, a) 2 ⇡i, !(a) = i and a is applicable in s.
Definition 9 (Global policy). Let ⇧ = hs0, A,!,'gi be a
cooperative planning problem. Then a global policy ⇡ is
a mapping ⇡ : Sgl ! P(A) satisfying the requirements
applicability (1), and uniformity (2), (3) below,
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(1) For all s 2 Sgl, a 2 ⇡(s): a is applicable in s!(a).
(2) For all s 2 Sgl, a, a0 2 ⇡(s)with a 6= a0: !(a) 6= !(a0).
(3) For all s, t 2 Sgl, a 2 ⇡(s) s.t. s!(a) = t!(a): a 2 ⇡(t).
Proposition 3. Any joint policy (⇡i)i2A induces a global




i) | i 2 A and ⇡i(si) is defined
 
.
Conversely, any global policy ⇡ induces a joint policy
(⇡i)i2A given by
⇡i(s
i) = a for all (s,A0) 2 ⇡, a 2 A0 with !(a) = i.
Proof. First we prove that the induced mapping ⇡ as defined
above is a global policy. Condition (1): If a 2 ⇡(s) then
⇡i(si) = a for some i, and by definition of joint policy this
implies a is applicable in si. Condition (2): We prove the
contrapositive. Assume a, a0 2 ⇡(s) with !(a) = !(a0).
By definition of ⇡ we have ⇡i(si) = a and ⇡j(sj) = a0
for some i, j. By definition of joint policy, !(a) = i and
!(a0) = j. Since !(a) = !(a0) we get i = j and hence
⇡i(si) = ⇡j(sj). This implies a = a0. Condition (3): As-
sume a 2 ⇡(s) and s!(a) = t!(a). By definition of ⇡ and
joint policy, we get ⇡i(si) = a for i = !(a). Thus si = ti,
and since ⇡i(si) = a, we immediately get ⇡i(ti) = a and
hence a 2 ⇡(t). We now prove that the induced mappings
(⇡i)i2A defined above form a joint policy. Constraint (1) en-
sures the applicability property as required by Definition 8,
while the constraints (2) and (3) ensure the right-uniqueness
of each partial function ⇡i.
By Proposition 3, we can identify joint and global poli-
cies, and will in the following move back and forth between
the two. Notice that Definitions 8 and 9 allow a policy to
distinguish between modally equivalent states. A more so-
phisticated definition avoiding this is possible, but is beyond
the scope of this paper. Usually, a policy ⇡ is only consid-
ered to be a solution to a planning problem if it is closed
in the sense that ⇡ is defined for all non-goal states reach-
able following ⇡. Here, we want to distinguish between two
different notions of closedness: one that refers to all states
reachable from a centralized perspective, and one that refers
to all states considered reachable when tracking perspective
shifts. To that end, we distinguish between centralized and
individual successor functions.
Definition 10. A successor function is a function   : Sgl ⇥
A! P(Sgl) mapping pairs of a global states s and applica-
ble actions a to sets  (s, a) of possible successor states.
We can then define the centralized successor function as
 cen(s, a) = Globals(s⌦ a).
It specifies the global states that are possible after the appli-
cation of a in s. If closedness of a global policy ⇡ based on
the centralized successor function is required, then no ex-
ecution of ⇡ will ever lead to a non-goal state where ⇡ is
undefined. Like for sequential planning, we are again in-
terested in the decentralized scenario where each agent has
to plan and decide when and how to act by himself under
incomplete knowledge. We achieve this by encoding the
perspective shifts to the next agent to act in the individual
successor function
 ind(s, a) = Globals(s!(a) ⌦ a).
Unlike  cen(s, a),  ind(s, a) considers a global state s0 to be
a successor of s after application of a if agent !(a) consid-
ers s0 possible after the application of a, not only if s0 is ac-
tually possible from a global perspective. Thus,  cen(s, a)
is always a (possibly strict) subset of  ind(s, a), and a pol-
icy ⇡ind that is closed wrt.  ind(s, a) must be defined for at
least the states for which a policy ⇡cen that is closed wrt.
 cen(s, a) must be defined. This corresponds to the intu-
ition that solution existence for decentralized planning with
implicit coordination is a stronger property than solution ex-
istence for centralized planning. For both successor func-
tions, we can now formalize what a strong solution is that
can be executed collectively by the agents. Our notion satis-
fies the usual properties of strong plans (Cimatti et al. 2003),
namely closedness, properity and acyclicity.
Definition 11 (Strong Policy). Let ⇧ = hs0, A,!,'gi be a
cooperative planning problem and   a successor function. A
global policy ⇡ is called a strong policy for ⇧ with respect
to   if
(i) Finiteness: ⇡ is finite.
(ii) Foundedness: for all s 2 Globals(s0),
(1) s |= 'g , or
(2) ⇡(s) 6= ;.
(iii) Closedness: for all (s,A0) 2 ⇡, a 2 A0, s0 2  (s, a),
(1) s0 |= 'g , or
(2) ⇡(s0) 6= ;.
Note that we do not explicitly require acyclicity, since this
is already implied by a literal interpretation of the product
update semantic that ensures unique new world names after
each update. It then follows from (i) and (iii) that ⇡ is proper.
We call strong plans with respect to  cen centralized policies
and strong plans with respect to  ind implicitly coordinated
policies.
Example 6. Consider again the letter passing prob-
lem introduced in Example 5. Let s0,2 and s0,3 denote the
global states that are initially considered possible by agent 2.
s0,2 =
at-1, for-2 at-1, for-3
2, 3
s0,3 =
at-1, for-2 at-1, for-3
2, 3
With s1,3 = s0,3 ⌦ a12, a policy for agent 2 is given by
⇡1 = {s0,3 7! a12, s0,2 7! a12} ,⇡2 = {s1,3 7! a23} .
After the contemplated application of a12 by agent 1 (in both
cases), agent 2 can distinguish between s1,2 = s0,2 ⌦ a12,
where the goal is already reached and nothing has to be
done, and s1,3, where agent 2 can apply a23, leading directly
to the goal state s1,3 ⌦ a23. Thus, ⇡ is an implicitly coor-
dinated policy for ⇧2. While in the sequential case, agent 2
has to wait for the first action a12 of agent 1 to be able to
find its subplan, it can find the policy (⇡i)i2A in advance by
explicitly planning for a run-time distinction.
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In general, strong policies can be found by performing
an AND-OR search, where AND branching corresponds to
branching over different epistemic worlds and OR branch-
ing corresponds to branching over different actions. By con-
sidering modally equivalent states as duplicates and thereby
transforming the procedure into a graph search, space and
time requirements can be reduced, although great care has
to be taken to deal with cycles correctly.
It is easy to show that implicitly coordinated policies gen-
eralize implicitly coordinated plans.
Proposition 4. Each implicitly coordinated plan
(a1, . . . , an) for ⇧ = hs0, A,!,'gi has a corresponding
implicitly coordinated policy ⇡ for ⇧.
Proof sketch. Let si = s0 ⌦ a1 ⌦ . . . ⌦ ai. Then we can
construct the policy ⇡ with ⇡(s0i) = ai+1 for all s0i 2
Globals(si) and all i = 0, . . . , n 1. All three requirements
of Definition 9 trivially hold. We further have to show that
⇡ is an implicitly coordinated policy for ⇧. Finiteness and
foundedness are trivial. Closedness results from the corre-
spondence to the recursive part of Proposition 2.
4 Experiments
We implemented a planner that is capable of finding implic-
itly coordinated plans and policies, and conducted two ex-
periments: one small case study of the Russian card prob-
lem (van Ditmarsch 2003) intended to show how this prob-
lem can be modeled and solved from an individual perspec-
tive, and one experiment investigating the scaling behavior
of our approach on private transportation problems in the
style of Examples 5 and 6, using instances of increasing size.
Our planner is written in C++ and uses breadth-first search
with an approximate bisimulation test that is used for state
contraction and duplicate detection. All experiments were
performed on a computer with a single Intel i7-4510U CPU
core.
4.1 Russian Card Problem
In the Russian card problem, seven cards numbered 0, . . . , 6
are randomly dealt to three agents. Alice and Bob get three
cards each, while Eve gets the single remaining card. Ini-
tially, each agent only knows its own cards. The task is now
for Alice and Bob to inform each other about their respec-
tive cards using only public announcements, without reveal-
ing the holder of any single card to Eve. The problem was
analyzed and solved from the global perspective by van Dit-
marsch et al. (2006), and a given protocol was verified from
an individual perspective by A˚gotnes et al. (2010) before.
We want to solve the problem from the individual perspec-
tive of agent Alice and find an implicitly coordinated policy
for her. We only allow ontic announcements about hands,
not about knowledge. To keep the problem computationally
feasible, we impose some restrictions on the resulting proto-
col, namely that the first action has to be Alice announcing
five possible alternatives for her own hand (one of which
has to be her true hand), and that the second action has to
be Bob announcing the card Eve is holding. Without loss of
generality, we fix one specific initial hand for Alice, namely
012. From a plan for this initial hand, plans for all other ini-
tial hands can be obtained by renaming. For simplicity, we
only generate applicable actions for Alice, i.e. announce-
ments that include her true hand 012. This results in the
planning problem having a total of 46376 options for the
first action, and 7 for the second action. Still, the initial state
s0 consist of 140worlds, one for each possible deal of cards.
Agents can only distinguish worlds where their own hands
differ. Alice’s designated worlds in her associated local state
of s0 are those four worlds in which she holds hand 012.
Our planner, run in the conditional planning mode, needs
7282 seconds and approximately 630MB of memory to
come up with a solution policy. In the solution, Alice first
announces her hand to be one of 012, 034, 156, 236, and
245. It can be seen that each of the five hands other than
the true hand 012 contains at least one of Alice’s and one of
Bob’s cards, meaning that Bob will immediately be able to
identify the complete deal. Since also every card occurs in
exactly two of the five announced hands, of which at least
one is considered possible by Eve, she stays unaware of the
individual cards of Alice and Bob. Afterwards, Alice can
wait for Bob to announce that Eve has either card 3, 4, 5 or
6 (which will not tell Eve anything new, either).
4.2 Mail Instances
Our second experiment concerns the letter passing problem
from Examples 5 and 6. We generalized the scenario to al-
low an arbitrary number of agents with an arbitrary undi-
rected neighborhood graph, indicating which agents are al-
lowed to directly pass letters to each other. As neighborhood
graphs, we used randomly generated Watts-Strogatz small-
world networks (Watts and Strogatz 1998), exhibiting char-
acteristics that can also be found in social networks. Watts-
Strogatz networks have three parameters: The number N of
nodes (determining the number of agents in our setting), the
average numberK of neighbors per node (roughly determin-
ing the average branching factor of a search for a plan), and
the probability   of an edge being a “random shortcut” in-
stead of a “local connection” (thereby influencing the short-
est path lengths between agents). We only generate con-
nected networks in order to guarantee plan existence.
We distinguish between the MAILTELL and the
MAILCHECK benchmarks. To guarantee plan existence, in
both scenarios the actions are modeled such as to ensure that
the letter position remains common knowledge among the
agents in all reachable states. The mechanics of MAILTELL
directly correspond to those given in Example 5. There
is only one type of action, publicly passing the letter to a
neighboring agent while privately informing him about the
final addressee. This allows for sequential implicitly co-
ordinated plans. In the resulting plans, letters are simply
moved along a shortest path to the addressee. In contrast,
in MAILCHECK, an agent that has the letter can only check
if he himself is the addressee or not using a separate action
(without learning the actual addressee if it is not him). To
ensure plan existence in this scenario, we allow an agent
to pass on the letter only if it is destined for someone else.
Unlike in MAILTELL, conditional plans are required here.
In a solution (policy), the worst-case sequence of succes-
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sively applied actions contains an action passing the letter
to each agent at least once. As soon as the addressee has
been reached, execution is stopped. Experiments were
conducted for both scenarios with different parameters (see
Tables 1, 2 and 3). For each set of parameters, 100 trials
were performed. The tables show the average numbers of
nodes that were created, expanded and discarded (because
a bisimilar state was already considered somewhere else)
in the search. For the conditional search in MAILCHECK,
compound AND-OR nodes are used. In Table 1, direct path
denotes the average shortest path length between sender and
addressee, while in Tables 2 and 3, full path denotes the av-
erage length of a shortest path passing through all agents
starting from the sender.
While the shortest path length between sender and ad-
dressee grows very slowly with the number of agents (due
to the shortcut connections in the network), the shortest path
passing through all agents roughly corresponds to the num-
ber of agents. Since these measures directly correspond to
the minimal plan lengths, the observed exponential growth
of space and time requirements with respect to them (and to
the baseK) is unsurprising.
Note also that in both scenarios, the number of agents de-
termines the number of worlds (one for each possible ad-
dressee) in the initial state. Since the preconditions of the
available actions are mutually exclusive, this constitutes an
upper bound on the number of worlds per state throughout
the search. Thus we get only a linear overhead in compari-
son to directly searching the networks for the relevant paths.
5 Conclusion and Future Work
We defined and studied an interesting new cooperative, de-
centralized planning concept without the necessity of ex-
plicit coordination or negotiation. Instead, by modeling all
possible communication directly as plannable actions and
relying on the ability of the autonomous agents to put them-
selves into each others shoes (using perspective shifts), some
problems can be elegantly solved achieving implicit coordi-
nation between the agents. We briefly demonstrated an im-
plementation of both the sequential and conditional solution
algorithms and its performance on the Russian card problem
and two letter passing problems.
An important starting point for further research concerns
concrete problems (e.g. epistemic versions of established
multi-agent planning problems) and the question of which
kind of communicative actions the agents would need to
solve these problems in an implicitly coordinated way. As
seen in the MAILTELL benchmark, the dynamic epistemic
agents 10 20 30 40 50
direct path 1.4 2.3 3.1 3.7 3.6
created 25 116 415 965 1023
expanded 7 36 142 347 359
discarded 2 32 166 455 443
time/s 0.02 0.14 0.65 2.38 5.02
Table 1: MAILTELL,K = 4,   = 0.1
agents 10 15 20 25 30
full path 10.4 16.1 21.7 27.6 33.2
created 402 2073 8065 35691 113481
expanded 361 1968 7771 34890 111582
discarded 552 3229 13126 59827 193555
time/s 0.02 0.18 1.14 8.03 38.76
Table 2: MAILCHECK,K = 2,   = 0.1
agents 7 9 11 13 15
full path 7.0 9.0 11.0 13.0 15.0
created 712 3161 13071 50104 188997
expanded 642 3027 12838 49739 188421
discarded 1859 9167 39528 154756 588582
time/s 0.03 0.21 1.14 5.90 27.30
Table 3: MAILCHECK,K = 4,   = 0.1
treatment of a problem does not necessarily lead to more
than linear overhead. It will be interesting to identify classes
of tractable problems and see how agents cope in a simu-
lated environment. Another issue that is relevant in prac-
tice concerns the interplay of the single agents’ individual
plans. In our setting, the agents have to plan individually
and decide autonomously when and how to act. Also, when
it comes to action application, there is no predefined no-
tion of agent precedence. This leads to the possibility of
incompatible plans, and in consequence to the necessity for
agents having to replan in some cases. While our notion of
implicitly coordinated planning explicitly forbids the execu-
tion of actions leading to deadlock situations (i.e. non-goal
states where there is no implicitly coordinated plan for any
of the agents), replanning can still lead to livelocks. Both
the conditions leading to livelocks and individually applica-
ble strategies to avoid them can be investigated. Since we
need to be able to deal with replanning anyway, we can fol-
low Andersen, Bolander, and Jensen (2013) and also inves-
tigate another successor function  plaus that maps only into
the most plausible successor states. We expect this to lead to
less branching and thus higher efficiency than the successor
functions defined above.
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